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Foreword
Armed violence is an everyday reality for millions of people around the
globe. More than 700 000 people die as a result of armed violence each year.
Many more experience traumatic loss in their families and are left with lasting psychological and physical scars. The impact of armed violence extends
further, negatively influencing development, peace and good governance,
often by creating a climate of impunity, corruption and by undermining
public institutions. It is also closely tied with transnational crime and the
misery and abuse associated with the illegal trafficking of arms, drugs and
people. Finally, the economic impact of armed violence is striking with the
cost of lost productivity due to non-conflict armed violence alone estimated
to cost upwards of USD 95 billion annually worldwide. This violence has
important youth and gender dimensions. The majority of perpetrators and
victims are men, while women and girls are at greater risk of violence that is
less visible and committed in the private sphere, including intimate partner
violence, child abuse, sexual and gender based violence. Measures at reducing armed violence are therefore also measures at reducing human suffering.
The OECD DAC policy paper Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling
Development, published in 2009, acknowledged as a challenge the increased
levels of armed violence in non-conflict countries, the increasing linkage
between conflict and crime, rapidly growing youth populations in the south
and accelerating levels of unregulated urbanisation. The paper provided a
methodology to help donors tackle the programming challenging of reducing
armed violence. Building on the OECD DAC policy paper, three programming notes were developed to contribute to our understanding of specific
types of armed violence: Youth and armed violence, armed violence in
urban areas and Security System Reform in relation to Armed violence
reduction. Each note aims to improve our understanding of these dynamics
while also offering practical assistance on assessments, programme design,
risk management, monitoring and evaluation, as well as on entry points for
direct and indirect programming.
2011 is an important year for global efforts at Armed violence reduction with a series of regional best practice seminars as well as the high-level
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conference on Armed violence reduction in the context of the Geneva declaration on armed violence and development, scheduled for October 2011. I
strongly encourage the use of these programming notes to strengthen our
understanding of these critical development issues and to support new innovative programmatic guidelines for Armed violence reduction.

Jordan Ryan
Assistant Administrator and
Director, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
United Nations Development Programme
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OECD Armed Violence Reduction (AVR)
programming notes
Approximately 740 000 people die as a result of armed violence each
year. Armed violence erodes governance and peace whilst slowing down
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG’s). It can have as
significant an effect on security and development in settings of chronic violent crime and inter-personal violence as it can in societies affected by war
or civil conflict. An armed violence agenda therefore includes a wide range
of countries, cities and citizens whose development and security are under
threat. It refers to the use or threatened use of weapons to inflict injury, death
or psychosocial harm.
To help desk officers and conflict/fragility experts who are working to tackle
the problem of armed violence, OECD Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) members have requested three Armed Violence Reduction (AVR)
Programming Notes to build on the OECD DAC policy paper on Armed Violence
Reduction: Enabling Development (OECD, 2009). The three notes cover:
•

Armed violence in urban areas: The majority of the world’s population now lives in urban centres. As economic transformations accelerate rural-urban migration, the rural poor are being converted into
an urban poor who populate mega-slums on the periphery of major
urban centres. More and more of these areas are afflicted by high
levels of armed violence.

•

Youth and armed violence: The largest-ever generation of young
people is now entering adulthood. Almost half of the world’s population is under the age of 24 and the vast majority of 10-24 year olds
live in less developed countries. Youth are particularly at risk of
being exposed to and engaging in, armed violence and crime.

•

AVR and Security System Reform (SSR): AVR and SSR have similar
objectives and are mutually reinforcing. But they also have their distinct methods, entry points and comparative advantages. It is important
to understand the linkages between the two approaches in order to
maximise the impact of public safety and security interventions.
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To ensure an effective response to armed violence, the programming
notes use an armed violence “lens”, which was developed in Armed Violence
Reduction: Enabling Development. The lens helps practitioners consider the
key elements shaping armed violence patterns. These include the people
affected by armed violence, the perpetrators and their motivations, the availability of instruments (arms) and the wider institutional/cultural environment that enables and/or protects against armed violence. The lens highlights
risk factors associated with armed violence and their vertical linkages from the
local to the global level. It encourages practitioners to think outside specific
sector mandates and provides practical entry points for AVR programming.
Armed violence prevention and reduction are feasible but require significant leadership by affected states and investment of financial resources by
development partners. They also require the ability to engage with non-state
and sub-national actors. Finally, evidence suggests that effective interventions
need a good evidence base, participatory assessments and the simultaneous
engagement in multiple sectors (reflecting the broad range of interrelated issues
and actors involved), at multiple levels (local, national, regional and global) and
over a longer time horizon.
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Introduction
Security System Reform (SSR1 ) and Armed Violence Reduction (AVR)
share the same objective: to contribute to stability, safety and security as an
enabling environment for development. As such, “SSR and AVR are highly
complementary and mutually reinforcing” (OECD, 2009, p. 111). Building
on the recent OECD policy paper, Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling
Development (2009), this note describes how the linkages between AVR
and SSR programming can be used effectively in programme design and
implementation for donors, policy makers and practitioners, as well as programme managers, practitioners and civil society staff at headquarters and
in the field.
This topic falls under the umbrella of the OECD DAC’s International
Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), which aims to advise donors
on how best to assist countries in preventing or recovering from conflict
and fragility. Both AVR and SSR are key policy and programmatic building
blocks in helping to build peaceful states and viable state institutions in post
conflict and fragile settings. In this sense AVR and SSR form a critical part
of the reform agenda in post conflict and fragile settings. Both AVR and SSR
can be seen as core areas of reform that help bridge the security-development
nexus and also help to operationalise the peacebuilding and statebuilding
narrative.
This programming note gives guidance to those seeking to reinforce
programmes by utilising the linkages between AVR and SSR in cases where
it has been calculated that such synergy would enhance impact. Attention is
given to AVR topics and programming options that offer relevant ways to
improve the service delivery of security and justice bodies, which are not
(sufficiently) addressed within current SSR programmes as detailed in the
OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (2007). Likewise, the note
also points out ways in which AVR projects can be complemented by concurrent SSR operations. The approaches are illustrated by examples from the
field demonstrating how and why the AVR-SSR synergy has proven useful
in particular settings.
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The structure of the paper is as follows:
•

Chapter 1 provides a concise discussion of the concepts of SSR and
AVR and a brief overview of the linkages between the two.

•

Chapter 2 starts at the beginning of the programming cycle by focusing on assessment and design, specifically using the Armed Violence
(AV) lens and innovative assessment techniques to underscore how
they can help fine-tune SSR programme planning.

•

Chapter 3 introduces two programmatic approaches that can help
promote positive synergies between AVR and SSR. The first discusses
how SSR programming can adopt an AVR emphasis. The second discusses ways to ensure that AVR and SSR programmes and activities
complement each other.

•

Chapter 4 describes entry points for programming. It gives examples
of how the existence of an SSR programme can facilitate the introduction of AVR and vice versa.

•

Chapter 5 concludes the programming note with a brief description of
the different AVR and SSR approaches to monitoring and evaluation.
Specific consideration is given to indicator design and involvement of
local stakeholders.

Linking Security System Reform and Armed Violence Reduction: Programming Note – © OECD 2011
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Chapter 1
The concepts of Security System Reform and
Armed Violence Reduction

Security System Reform
“Security System Reform is another term used to describe the transformation of the ’security system’ – which includes all the actors, their roles,
responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the
system” (OECD, 2005, p. 20). SSR programming aims to support countries in
the development of more effective, efficient and accountable security and justice systems, which are better able to meet the justice and security needs of its
citizens in “a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles
of governance and the rule of law” (OECD, 2005; OECD, 2007). By carefully
identifying the security needs of the people in a society – including women,
men, boys, girls, minorities, vulnerable groups etc. – and what is required to
meet those needs, an SSR programme can be designed to improve the ability
of the security system to provide security services. As such, the concept of
SSR emphasises a people-centred approach. Its method for achieving security
of the population is to improve the capacity and accountability of security
institutions and bodies.
The security system is comprised of nine sub-sectors (OECD, 2007):
accountability and oversight; defence; intelligence and security service;
integrated border management; police; justice; private security and military
companies; and civil society. Certain sectors may be targeted for reform
based on the needs identified within the specific context or as entry points
for wider reform. Yet it is important to remember that the sectors form a
holistic system. As such, reform in one sector needs to take into account the
effects of insufficiencies in other sectors and the impact of reforms on related
sectors as well. Thus, collaboration between sectors is fundamental and the
concept of SSR is holistic in its approach to design and implementation of
programming.2
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Armed Violence Reduction
Increasingly, it is being recognised that armed violence has a profound
negative effect on (human) development (United Nations Secretary General
(UNSG), 2009; OECD, 2009; Geneva Declaration, 2006; Geneva Declaration,
2008). Armed violence is broadly defined as: “the use or threatened use of
weapons to inflict injury, death or psychosocial harm, which undermines development” (OECD, 2009, p. 21). This includes interpersonal violence such as
violent crime and collective violence such as armed conflict, gang violence, or
forms of organised crime. AVR programmes focus on reducing armed violence
by integrating “developmental and preventative programmes with more effective law enforcement and diplomatic/political efforts” (OECD, 2009, p. 22).
AVR programming targets risk and protective factors that appear to
increase or reduce the likelihood of armed violence. For example, a large
presence of arms in a community can be a risk factor for armed violence,
whereas an attitude or culture within a society that challenges the use of firearms can be a protective factor. These factors are identified through rigorous
analyses of data drawn from epidemiological and other quantitative as well
as qualitative methods, which assemble information on types and levels of
armed violence. In addition, the “armed violence lens” helps capture key features of armed violence that can increase practitioners’ awareness of contextspecific drivers, risk factors, protective factors and effects of armed violence
(OECD, 2009, p. 49). Its application in assessments helps create a rich picture
of the various elements of armed violence: the people it affects; the perpetrators; the instruments with which it is perpetrated; and the institutions
that influence it; as well as its local, national, regional and global dimensions.
AVR programmes address the causes and effects of armed violence at
different levels: at international and national levels – the institutional actors
and legal frameworks managing and governing the use of armed violence
– as well as at the local community and individual level. AVR programmes
often seek to establish security as defined by ordinary citizens, since the
local and sub-national level is where armed violence is experienced most
directly. In doing this, AVR explicitly recognises that citizens’ perceptions
of security are not necessarily uniform: men and women, people of different ages, social or ethnic backgrounds may have different perceptions of
security needs. As such, AVR programmes are closely linked to community
security programmes. AVR programmes seek to increase security through
direct programmes that specifically target the reduction and prevention of
armed violence and its effects, as well as indirect programmes that involve
development programming that mainstream AVR elements so that programming is AVR-sensitive and includes AVR sub-goals (OECD, 2009, p. 86-87).
For example, direct programming targets factors contributing to the use of
armed violence such as Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). Indirect
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Box 1.1. A common denominator in SSR and AVR: The importance of gender
The mutual aim to be people-centred represents a strong link between SSR and AVR. Tuning
security programmes to the needs of citizens requires recognising that these needs, like
communities, are not homogenous. Security and armed violence are highly gendered: men,
women, boys and girls3 contribute to and experience violence and insecurity in different
ways. This understanding is made explicit in both AVR and SSR literature: unequal access
to security and justice services, normalisation of gender-based violence and imbalanced
representation within security forces are seen as corollaries of gender disparities that shape
the security realities of men and women, boys and girls differently. Therefore, at each point
within programming, security practitioners should consider the particular experiences of men
and women, as well as the role that gender relations and norms play in enabling or reducing
violence. Including such a perspective not only enhances programmes’ efficacy and reach, but
can furthermore work to address some of the systemic sources of insecurity.
Specific guidance for mainstreaming gender in programmes can be drawn from both AVR
and SSR approaches. One common aim is to gather accurate perspectives of men and women,
boys and girls and integrating those particular views into programming. This necessarily
involves considering and accommodating for social and practical barriers (e.g. restricted
mobility; public participation; literacy) that may restrict men or women from participating in
assessments, monitoring and evaluation surveys. It also requires collecting sex-disaggregated
data and striving to maintain gender balance in (participatory) surveys. Application of the AV
lens in (SSR) assessments can assist in highlighting the specific factors that increase men and
women’s likelihood of becoming a target and/or perpetrator of violence, as well as their specific roles in formal and informal institutions that enable or reduce the use of armed violence.
It can also help to highlight barriers that prevent the recruitment, integration and promotion
of women in the security bodies – an aim of SSR programmes.
This type of analysis can be used to appropriately target programming responses and monitor
the effects of programmes for men and women. Moreover, analysis of gender-sensitive data
can help programmers design and further develop indicators that reflect men and women’s
distinct perceptions and experiences of (in)security. In turn, this can inspire new approaches
or reveal valuable entry points for programmers to co-operate with local actors in addressing locally-defined aspects of (in)security that stem from gender norms and relations, such
as violent masculinity or unequal participation in (oversight of) security forces. In this way,
including gender perspectives allows for more precisely tailored security programmes that
meet people’s expectations and needs.
For further reference see: Bastic, M. (2008), Integrating Gender in Post-Conflict Security Sector
Reform, Policy Paper No.29, DCAF (Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces),
Geneva.; Valasek, K. (2008), “Security Sector Reform and Gender”, Gender and Security Sector
Reform Toolkit, DCAF, Geneva.; and: Kristen, A. (2007), Guns and Roses: Gender and Armed
Violence in Africa, UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), Geneva.
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programming targets more general protective and risk factors for armed violence, which can include urban renewal schemes and street lighting projects.

Conceptual synergies between AVR and SSR
The ultimate objective of both SSR and AVR is to contribute to a safe,
stable and secure environment in which development can take place. As such,
they are mutually complementary programming strategies. However, each

Box 1.2. Complementarities of AVR and SSR: The justice sector
AVR and SSR both incorporate a focus on justice as an important component for reducing
violent conflict, armed violence and enhancing crime prevention – all of which are conditions for a stable, conducive environment for development. Both assert that the justice sector
is instrumental for people’s security. That said, both approaches have slightly different, but
complementary, perspectives on how justice contributes to security.
For SSR, building legitimate, democratic judicial institutions, which subscribe to international human rights standards is fundamental and must be addressed in a comprehensive
manner (OECD, 2007, p. 182). In addition, the justice sector is vital for effective SSR because
it is directly linked to successful service delivery in many other security sectors, in particular
police and prisons. AVR on the other hand, draws attention to how criminal justice reform
– improving the capacity to detect, investigate, adjudicate and sentence criminal offences –
may be connected with indirect security provision such as community centres that counsel
at-risk youth or provide sports and music clubs as an alternative to joining gangs. As such,
indirect AVR programming is able to reinforce some core activities of SSR (such as reforming
juvenile detention centres or strengthening police presence in gang epicentres) and, thereby,
enhance whole-of-government approaches (OECD, 2009, p. 51).
Moreover, formal and informal justice mechanisms are seen as an important part of the risk
and protective factors for armed violence that can be targeted in AVR programming. SSR
equally recognises the importance of both formal and informal mechanisms for the justice
sector and the need to address both in programming. Applying both AVR and SSR perspectives encourages attention to how justice is provided through both formal and informal
arrangements, the possible tensions between them and their impact on other components of
security. Furthermore, each perspective offers insight into the array of justice mechanisms
that security programmers can support when tailoring a programme to a specific context.
Since both AVR and SSR accrue importance to the justice sector, and, taken together, recognise the several ways in which it links with security, it is an area where there is a great need
as well as opportunity to ensure complementarity and to avoid duplication and gaps. Justice
is therefore one of the sectors where synergies, in terms of entry points, sequencing and
complementary programming, can greatly enhance the effectiveness of both programmes.
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programme has its own specific methods to reach this common objective,
which implies that each has a comparative advantage. The most effective
synergies can be found where each approach can employ its strengths while
being complemented by the other. In other words, when thinking about the
opportunities for effective synergies between AVR and SSR, it is important
to consider the added value and comparative advantage of each approach.
SSR focuses on building an effective, efficient and accountable security
system that meets people’s security and justice needs in order to contribute
to an environment in which people feel safe. This necessitates due attention to differing security needs of, for instance, men and women as well as
vulnerable ethnic and social groups. Yet, although the concept of SSR promotes a people-centred and holistic approach, SSR practice mostly focuses
on enhancing the ability of the state to meet a range of security and justice
challenges and needs through the mechanisms and instruments at its disposal
(OECD, 2007, p. 21; OECD, 2005, p. 1). SSR programmes are typically carried out as purely technical enterprises (Rathmell, 2009), in that they concentrate on improving operations capacities and mostly use a “train and equip”
method. As such, the people-centred approach of SSR is often not operationalised and while attention has been focused on pursuing holistic SSR, this
has proven very difficult to put into practice. However, SSR offers a clear and
well-developed set of guidelines and tools for,4 as well as practical experience
in, strengthening the capacity of security institutions and oversight bodies,5
and this is where its comparative advantage lies.
AVR is broader in scope than SSR, as it “aims to reduce the risks and
effects of armed violence” (OECD, 2009, p. 22). AVR programming addresses
contextual factors of security, such as socio-economic development and community coherence. Thus AVR is able to target risk and protective factors at all
levels (from international to local). As such it can include a focus on improving the capacity of state institutions – such as ministries of health, education
or internal affairs – as well as legal reform to deal with armed violence.6
However, given AVR’s explicit emphasis on establishing security at the local
level including community security, its comparative strength lies in its ability
to drive bottom-up or top-down (for instance strengthening national firearms
control regimes) interventions grounded in good contextual understanding
and on the basis of a developmental and local approach. Recognising that local
communities are not homogeneous, the AVR approach advocates for the differentiation between the security needs of various social groups and provides
examples of how to break data down on the bases of, for example, gender,
social status and identity traits.
By drawing on the comparative advantages, the two approaches can
mutually reinforce each other. There may even be overlaps – for example, it is
easily recognised that SSR (by improving the capacity of security bodies) can
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reduce risk factors for armed violence. However, this does not mean that SSR
and AVR programmes should be merged. Blurring the distinction between
programmes will make it more difficult to identify clear programming tasks
and thereby risks increasing co-ordination problems.
Instead, effective linkages can be found by carefully assessing which
programmatic approach, or what combination or sequence of the two, is most
suited to address particular justice and security needs. For example, as was
pointed out above, the comparative strength of AVR lies in its grassroots,
developmental and locally focused approach that often remains underdeveloped in SSR practice. By complementing SSR with the grassroots components of AVR, programming can become more people-centred and locally
responsive, which could increase the programmes’ efficacy and sustainability.
Similarly, SSR has the potential to yield national level impacts through comprehensive and integrated reforms of the security system, which can contribute to stronger AVR programmes by scaling them up into SSR’s institutional
reform of security bodies.
In general terms, the AVR approach can help fine-tune SSR interventions
and enhance effectiveness by highlighting local, people-centred security
issues and proposing innovative means to address them; AVR can serve as
an entry point for dialogue on SSR (and vice versa); and SSR and AVR programming are complementary (OECD, 2009, p. 111-112). The rest of this note
elaborates these synergies in more detail, starting with assessment and design
of programming (Chapter 2), subsequently looking at practical programming options (Chapter 3), then turning to mutual SSR and AVR entry points
(Chapter 4) and finally discussing synergies in monitoring and evaluation
(M&E) (Chapter 5).
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Chapter 2
Assessment and design
Both Security System Reform and Armed Violence Reduction strongly
advocate that diagnostic assessments of the local context are central to effective programme design, implementation and evaluation (OECD, 2007, p. 41;
OECD, 2009, p. 60). SSR has a well-developed assessment methodology
that is laid out in the OECD DAC’s Handbook on Security System Reform
– Supporting Security and Justice. It gives clear guidance for SSR assessments in the different subsectors of the security system and advocates for the
inclusion of people’s perceptions of security and security needs in SSR assessments. AVR promotes the combined use of specialised methodologies and
tools that bring critical elements contributing to armed violence to the fore.
Incorporating such an AVR focus in SSR assessments can help refine, enhance
and refocus SSR towards its people-centeredness.7 Incorporating an AVR
perspective in SSR assessments can highlight which approach or combination
of approaches is most likely to generate positive results. Additionally, an AVR
focus in SSR assessments can assist in creating programmes that are more relevant to the specific needs of partner countries (in particular at the community
level) and, thereby, are better received by its affected population. Community
members are more likely to support activities they see as responding to their
articulated concerns (OECD, 2005, p. 66), which can enable programmes to
garner the local “buy in” that eludes many donor-driven SSR activities.
There are two ways in which an AVR perspective can be included in SSR
assessments: (1) by applying the Armed Violence lens; and (2) by applying
the specialised methodologies and tools AVR advocates.

Applying the armed violence lens in SSR assessments
The armed violence (AV) lens helps structure analyses according to
people, perpetrators, instruments and institutions that influence levels of
armed violence.
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•

The people component of the AV lens is primarily guided by the
question: “What is needed to make individuals and communities
feel safe and secure in the particular contexts in which they live?”
(OECD, 2009, p. 51). This includes attention to the diverse perceptions of security needs that the different groups (gender, age, social
identity) within these communities may have. Including this component in SSR assessments can help ensure an accurate picture of
micro-level security needs of women and men as well as other groups
and re-emphasise a people-centred SSR approach.

•

The perpetrator component of the AV lens focuses on mapping the
motivations (socio-economic, social status and identity, cultural factors, political identity and group status) of perpetrators and the ways
in which they are organised by disaggregating data by gender, age,
location and ethnicity (OECD, 2009, p. 53) (Box 2.1). SSR assessments – focusing heavily on security needs and institutional capacity – often give little explicit attention to the role of perpetrators.
Yet, this information can help fine tune SSR assessments in order to
effectively address perpetrators and contextual causes of insecurity.

•

The instruments component of the AV lens draws attention to the
supply and availability of weapons and ammunition, which pose a
risk factor for armed violence. It also includes a focus on the demand

Box 2.1. Viva Rio in Haiti: How an AVR assessment revealed incentives for
reducing violence
What works: The Tambou Lapè programme focused on reducing violence in Bel Air, an area
in the centre of Haiti’s capital Port au Prince. Through a process of extensive consultations
with community members, the NGO Viva Rio found out, among other things, that both community members and gang leaders had vested interests in educating their local youth. This
prompted an initiative that used collective incentives to reduce violence by introducing scholarship lotteries in communities that achieved concrete reductions in violence within specific
timelines and neighbourhoods as part of Tambou Lapè programme.
Why it works: Investing time and resources into participatory assessments enabled Viva Rio
to capitalise on local protection factors. A focus on the people and the perpetrators helped to
reveal issues concerning the role of gangs in the community, their motivations and the reputation they maintained as both predatory and protective actors. This information then provided
starting points for the design of activities directly linked to the common social concerns of
both the community and gangs, and allowed setting concrete parameters on which to base
indicators and benchmarks.
Source: Viva Rio (2009), Honour and Respect for Bel Air, Annual Report 2008, Haiti.
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factors that drive people to acquire or retain weapons (Box 2.2).
In order to create an effective, efficient and accountable security
system, SSR assessments need to include a focus on the capacity of
the sub-sectors and the system as a whole to effectively deal with the
prevalence of instruments of violence.
•

The institutions component of the AV lens distinguishes between
the formal and informal institutions that regulate and control the use
of armed violence. SSR focuses primarily on the formal institutions
i.e. those bodies and actors, state or non-state, delivering security and
justice services. The informal institutions are the social and cultural
practices, norms and values that organise social behaviour and form
the rules of the game for armed violence.

In particular, application of the AV lens in assessments of the sub-sectors
of the security system emphasises and highlights important issues that would
be underemphasised or overlooked in regular SSR assessments. Table 2.1.
lists aspects that are (re-)emphasised when the AV lens is incorporated in
SSR assessments, per sub-sector of the security system.

Box 2.2. SALW assessment in Burundi: A focus on people, perpetrators,
instruments and institutions
What works: A community-level assessment done in Burundi sought to provide valuable
information regarding the impact of the presence of weapons in a community, citizens’
motivations for obtaining weapons initially and for retaining them despite disarmament campaigns. It was revealed, for instance, that people characterised insecurity brought about by
weapon ownership as a disintegration of community trust. Popular perceptions of weapons,
weapon owners and disarmament campaigns were also discussed. Perpetrators were often
identified as former combatants who failed to reintegrate and turned to armed crime or mercenary work as an economic recourse. Instruments were often obtained to commit crimes
or resolve disputes, but rarely for personal protection. The instruments could be hired out,
illustrating the degree to which criminal weapons possession had been (informally) institutionalised. And the implication of the police and army in the lending of weapons further
demonstrated the involvement of formal institutions.
Why it works: All of the information gathered in the community assessment is essential
for focusing disarmament campaigns on the appropriate risk and resilience factors within
the given context, thereby showing options for specifically targeting those factors that could
strengthen the local community disarmament strategy.
Source: Forbes, A. (2007), Rapid Assessments of the Impact and Perceptions of Small Arms in the
Burundi Interior, DanChurchAid and Conseil National des Eglises du Burundi.
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Table 2.1. Issues (re-)emphasised when using the armed violence lens in SSR
assessments and programme design
Sector

People

Perpetrators

Instruments

Institutions

Accountability
and oversight

Capacity of civilian
oversight committees
and civil society oversight; decentralised
accountability structures for all sectors
of SSR; mechanisms
which enable public
complaint reporting

Criminal collusion with
security and justice
actors; corruption and
immunity undermining
the rule of law

Legislation on public
gun ownership;
regulation and tracking
measures for legally
purchased weapons

Informal or traditional
mechanisms of oversight; local cultural
systems of accountability; local perceptions
of legitimacy and how
to establish it; impunity
undermining the rule
of law

Defence reform

Perceived threats from
military forces; perceptions of disarmament,
demobilisation and
reintegration (DDR)
programme beneficiaries; community needs
for accepting DDR
beneficiaries

Human rights abuse
within military ranks;
unemployed ex-combatants; ex-combatants
excluded from DDR;
incentives for disarmament; DDR programmes for vulnerable
groups, in particular
women and children

Capacity in effective
stockpile management;
capacity for management of de-issued arms
(in DDR programmes);
(ex) combatants’
use and perception
of weapons after
discharge

Military role in internal
(in)security; resistance
to budget cutting of
military; corruption
and abuse of power
within military; legal
framework for defence
forces role in providing
security

Capacity to collect and
analyse intelligence
on weapons trade and
weapons presence;
responsibly sourcing
the knowledge of men
and women about
weapon depots, hidden
caches, trade routes
etc.

Capacity and legal
framework for intelligence and security
forces

Intelligence and Respecting human
Human rights abuses
security
rights standards while by intelligence service
engaging with citizens and security forces
to gain local insights
valuable to security;
identifying trends of
violence that excessively affect certain
groups (including a
focus on gender based
violence [GBV])
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Table 2.1. Issues (re-)emphasised when using the armed violence lens in SSR
assessments and programme design (continued)
Sector

People

Perpetrators

Instruments

Institutions

Integrated
border
management

Patterns of human
trafficking; patterns of
streams of refugees or
victims of armed violence; patterns of influx
of migration leading to
chaotic urbanisation

Capacity to address
trans-national crime
syndicates; violence
motivated by control
of ports and border
territories; unregulated
passage of perpetrators
across borders

Capacity to control
weapons import and
export; capacity for
stockpile management
of border management
forces

Legal frameworks
governing border management and migration departments and
agencies; relations with
neighbouring countries;
corruption and collusion of border guards;
capacity for addressing
human trafficking

Police

Relations between
police and societal
groups (e.g. men,
women, youths,
minorities); decentralised mechanisms of
accountability; level of
responsiveness and
capacity to respond
to local concerns;
capacity to provide
assistance to victims,
including specialised
procedures for assisting victims of GBV;
public expectations of
security provision

(History of) human
rights abuses within
police ranks; criminal
collusion or infiltration
of police; level of police
knowledge of perpetrators’ motives, strategies; specialised tactics
to address motivations
and violent behaviour
of perpetrators; level of
police knowledge and
capacity to deal with
perpetrators of GBV

Capacity to track and
manage weapons
issued to police; capacity to enforce public
arm regulations and
laws; use of force training; weapons training;
capacity to manage disarmament programmes

State of facilities;
capacity of organisational management;
protection and promotion of rule of law;
human rights training;
cultural attitudes
regarding GBV; levels
of corruption; existing
local/informal security
initiatives and links to
formal structures

Justice

Accessibility of courts;
trust in the court
system/level of “vigilante justice”; personal
security of judges,
prosecutors and witnesses; informal justice
networks

Corruption and “purchasable” justice;
“catch and release”
pattern of criminals;
prosecution of banditry,
interpersonal offenses

Capacity to prosecute
public arms violations;
legal framework and
penalties for illicit arms
possession

Legal framework for the
protection of vulnerable
groups’ rights (domestic violence, GBV);
impunity and corruption
undermining rule of law;
condition and function
of facilities; informal
justice institutions
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Sector

People

Perpetrators

Instruments

Institutions

Prison

Separate prisons for
women, men, children;
(dis)trust in prison
security; rehabilitation
of prisoners

Human rights abuse by
prison actors;
collusion of criminals
and prison guards;
corruption

Availability of arms
in prisons; stockpile
management of confiscated weapons; prison
personnel involvement
in arms supplies

Integrity and security
of facilities; corruption of prison guards;
overcrowding leading to
premature release

Private security
and military
companies
(PSC/PMC)

Need for private security Human rights abuse by
companies to fill gaps PSCs/PMCs, including
left by state security
sexual violence
(security vacuum)

Regulation of arms held
by private security and
military companies;
demand factors for
PSC/PMCs

Legitimacy and perceptions of need of
companies; legal regulation; legal authority
to use force; conflict or
co-operation with state
forces

Civil society

Public definitions of
legitimate representation; belief in civil society’s capacity to gauge,
analyse and represent
society’s needs and
concerns and to monitor risk factors

Knowledge of demand
factors for weapons;
knowledge of local
perception of weapons;
citizen movements or
campaigns against
arms; knowledge of
sources and locations
of arms

Integration of violence
into local culture;
regulatory framework
for NGO operations;
reputation of organisations within community
and public institutions;
groups’ legitimate
representativeness,
including representation of gender, age and
minority groups

Role of local powerholders; issues of
capture and collusion;
capacity to monitor
and represent victims
of GBV

Innovative assessment techniques
AVR recognises existing assessment methods, such as population-based
surveys, stability and fragility assessments, conflict assessments, gender
analysis and criminal justice and governance assessments but promotes combining these existing tools and data sources, to uncover the likelihood for
violence and factors that can be targeted in programming (OECD, 2009, p. 41,
p. 61). Among these methods, the public health approach for instance, offers
a population-based analysis of the patterns, concentrations, risk factors and
protective factors of armed violence. As in traditional epidemiology, which
uses rigorous data collection techniques to map the causes and prevalence of
a health risk within a population, public health approaches to armed violence
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assessment aim to methodically deduce factors that increase or reduce the
likelihood of violence, or the likelihood of a person becoming either a perpetrator or victim of violence (World Health Organisation (WHO), 2009a). This
information can be used to enhance preventative responses at multiple levels,
such as state interventions (including SSR programmes), legislative policies,
municipal and community-based initiatives.

Box 2.3. Types of security knowledge generated by the public health approach
The results of a public health approach include quantified measures of:
•

What is happening: Are particular types of violence (i.e. gun-shot, domestic abuse,
rape, armed robbery, etc.) disproportionately prevalent?

•

Where it is happening: Are particular areas more or less prone to violent acts than
others?

•

To whom it is happening; Are particular groups (women, men, girls, boys, ethnic groups,
other minorities, etc.) more or less vulnerable to victimisation? Similarly, are particular
groups more or less likely to become perpetrators?

•

When it is happening: Do certain seasons, dates, or hours of the day see a significant
amount of violent incidents? Are certain periods notably calm or less likely to be disrupted by violence?

•

How often it is happening: Is the frequency of violence consistent enough to constitute a trend?

However, such public health information is not always accessible or
available – particularly in fragile contexts – and is typically labour-intensive
and expensive to collect. In volatile environments, there is also a heightened
risk of producing inaccurate results. The OECD Armed Violence Reduction
policy paper provides examples of other innovative data sources and tools
that can generate similarly detailed information, including Geographic
Information Systems and technologies that enable the combination of multiple data sources – such as statistics collected by customs officials, police,
development agencies – to help analyse patterns that may direct targeted
responses (OECD, 2009, p. 69) (for an example from Haiti: Kolbe and Hutson,
2006).
Statistical data on trends such as incidents of crime, demographic developments or food prices, can track correlations between these events and the
occurrence of violence, which may assist analysts in identifying and addressing risk factors.8 Similarly, disaggregating data by gender, age, ethnicity and/
or geography reveals any disproportionate effects of insecurity on certain
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groups or concentrations of insecurity in particular locations. Conversely,
measures of where, when and to whom violence is not occurring can expose
factors of local resilience and point to aspects that reduce the likelihood of
violence.
If the quality of the data allows, SSR policy makers and programme
coordinators can use population-based studies to design activities that are
accurately based on local realities, aptly scaled and implemented at the
appropriate level. For example, where the presence or absence of violence is
localised, the aberration may indicate risk or resilience factors that are unique
to a single community, and programming therefore may need to target this
community in particular. By contrast, if certain trends are found consistently
across several areas, this may signal systemic problems requiring effort to be
channelled through more municipal or national reforms. Rigorous statistical
evidence also has leveraging power to mobilise political means of addressing patterns of insecurity. Including statistical and public health experts in
assessment teams may facilitate the generation and use of this type of data.9

Box 2.4. Sierra Leone: Sexual abuse as a weapon of war
What works: Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) utilises the skills, expertise and credibility of health professionals in campaigning against Human Rights violations. PHR conducted
a comprehensive population-based study, assessing the prevalence and impact of sexual
violence among Internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Sierra Leone. Employing rigorous
scientific methodology and sampling techniques, the PHR researchers could record accurate
statistics and make reliable extrapolations to document the nature and pervasiveness of the
abuses reported in the survey. The study revealed, among other things, characteristics of the
perpetrators, assistance needs of the victims and indicated the systemic use of sexual abuse
by Revolutionary United Front (RUF) soldiers as a weapon of war. Their work, carried out
with support from the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and
local aides, produced a report that was used to convincingly advocate for the Special Court
on Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to give priority attention and
guarantee reparations to the victims of sexual violence.
Why it works: Epidemiological assessments and population-based studies are designed to
accurately depict the occurrence of particular threats within a wider context. Collecting such
information and presenting it in quantifiable terms can convey the distribution, outcomes and
risk factors of violence. In Sierra Leone the study was made possible through the assistance
of UNAMSIL, pre-existing population statistics and the existence of large IDP camps. These
factors facilitated both access and necessary conditions for proper sampling – two common
obstacles to conducting epidemiological studies in (post-)conflict areas.
Source: Thoms, O.N.T. and J. Ron (2007), “Public health, conflict and human rights: toward a collaborative research agenda”, Conflict and Health, Vol. 1, No. 11.
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Gender analysis of peace and security strategies and programmes has
received greater prominence in line with the United Nations (UN) Security
Council Resolutions on women, peace and security (notably SCR 1325 in 2000
and SCR 1820 in 2008). A focus on the impact of conflict on women, calls
for their greater participation in peacebuilding as well as combating sexual
violence in conflict, are framing greater attention to how security risks and
situations are assessed and how programmes such as SSR and AVR can reflect
these issues. In 2009, OECD DAC added a separate section of guidance on
“Integrating Gender Awareness and Equality” in the widely-used Handbook
on Security System Reform. Such adaptations continue to refine programme
assessment and design. Overall, an AVR-SSR approach encourages a pragmatic
Box 2.5. Bangladesh: Community consultation process on SALW
and an SSR programme
What works: Since Small arms and light weapons (SALW) and Improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) are considered an increasing security problem for Bangladesh, the Bangladesh
National Forum Against Small Arms and the Non-governmental organisation (NGO)
Saferworld undertook an extensive community consultation to identify safety and security
concerns of communities related to SALW and IEDs. The consultations brought together the
perspectives of 150 community representatives from 6 districts. They not only highlighted
the role of SALW and IEDs as a source of human insecurity, but showed that the role of the
police and border agencies was not always optimal. The border agencies were not able to
control the trafficking and smuggling of arms whilst law enforcement agencies were in some
cases a source of firearms. Consequently, the recommendations flowing from the consultation
process involved the strengthening of the capacity of law enforcement agencies for stockpile management and the strengthening of the Bangladesh Rifles – the agency responsible
for border management – as well as the customs and immigration agencies. In addition, it
was stressed that for effective policing (including on SALW and IED related matters) trust
between communities and the police is important, and therefore programmes to reinforce
community policing were recommended.
Why it works: The community-based consultations provided a grassroots perspective on
SALW’s impact on human security, generating valuable information for both national and
international actors trying to develop policies and programmes to address these issues. The
conclusions from the process highlighted gaps in the security sector and came up with recommendations to solve the challenges. Thus, the SALW consultations led to recommendations
for a potential SSR approach. Moreover, the consultation process allowed local communities
to engage with issues that were formerly dominated by the state, which is not only important
in order to find solutions, but also for increasing cooperation between the state, community
actors and citizens.
Source: National Forum Against Small Arms and Light Weapons and Saferworld (2006), Challenges
to Peace and Security: Consulting Communities on Small Arms in Bangladesh, Saferworld, London.
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and hands-on approach to assessment, where various tools are used flexibly
to find an appropriate mix of methods for the specific context and are directly
linked to programme needs, involving programme staff and beneficiaries from
the outset.

Programme design
Locally focused assessment prompts awareness of community dynamics
at the earliest phase of programming, during design and planning. Including
a focus on issues highlighted by the AV lens in an SSR assessment and using
population-based statistics to collect accurate knowledge of incidents and
types of armed violence can help identify local complexities that need to
be addressed through SSR programming. When subsequently setting up a
programme, project coordinators need to ensure that due attention is given to
each of the issues in the design of the objectives, beneficiaries, indicators for
monitoring and evaluation and outputs of a programme. Incorporating this
knowledge into design facilitates tailoring programme responses to the locallevel where the impact of violence is often most acute and dynamics are most
context-specific (Moser and McIlwaine, 2006).
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Chapter 3
Synergies between AVR and SSR programming activities

AVR emphasis in SSR
Having used the AV lens and other (combinations of) innovative assessment methods to identify where SSR can be strengthened, the next step is to
integrate these insights into actual programming activities. As in the example
of Bangladesh in Box 2.5, applying an AVR focus to a security assessment
can highlight certain aspects of AVR that need to be effectively addressed in
Table 3.1. Ideas for SSR programme activities with an AVR emphasis
SSR subsector

AVR emphasis in SSR

Police

Addressing the role of police officers as perpetrators, both towards women and men
Capacity-building on responding to gender-based violence/domestic violence
Capacity-building on addressing youth violence
Capacity-building on monitoring crime and homicide rates
Capacity-building on crime reporting systems and co-operation with public health systems

Defence

Addressing the role of (ex-) military as perpetrators both towards women and men

Justice

Addressing formal and informal institutions governing gun ownership and violent behaviour
Addressing formal and informal institutions covering the protection of vulnerable groups
Capacity-building to address land disputes
Capacity-building on adjudicating gender-based violence/domestic violence
Capacity-building on adjudicating youth violence

Civil society

Capacity-building on monitoring of armed violence, including violence perpetrated by actors in the
security system
Capacity-building in campaigning and advocacy on armed violence, including violence perpetrated
by actors in the security system
Capacity-building in campaigning and advocacy on gender-based violence/domestic violence
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SSR practice. Another clear example of SSR incorporating an AVR emphasis is the focus of many police and defence reform programmes on SALW
management and disarmament (see for an example in Cambodia: Bourne
and Greene, 2004). However, there are many other ways in which an AVR
emphasis in SSR can enhance the effectiveness of SSR programmes.10 Only
a proper assessment can indicate what form such a synergy should take in a
specific situation. However, in general, four sub-sectors were found to benefit
in particular from an AVR emphasis: police reform, defence reform, justice
reform and civil society. Table 3.1. gives a, by no means exhaustive, list of
ideas for SSR programming with an AVR emphasis in these sectors.

Box 3.1. Colombia: Police reform on domestic violence with a social
service emphasis
What works: The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has recognised
that domestic violence is a major problem in Latin-America and the Caribbean
and has incorporated it as a focus in their violence reduction programming.
An example of this can be found in Colombia, where the IDB’s projects have
included a focus on improving the interface between the police and victims
of domestic abuse. To achieve this, the IDB projects involved the training of
police officers on appropriately handling cases of domestic abuse. As part of
this programme, the IDB’s project in Bogotá also involved the establishment of
“family police stations”. These were multi-services stations that provided victims of domestic abuse with access to policing, legal, psychological and medical services in one location. In spite of some room for improvement in terms
of enforcement and capacity to mediate physical aggression against women,
the multi-service police stations were rated as “the most helpful public sector
institution in addressing issues of domestic violence”.
Why it works: The project in Bogotá shows an innovative way of emphasising
social services as part of a police reform programme. The programme effectively integrated a focus on social assistance for victims of domestic abuse into
a wider programme to improve police capacity in addressing domestic abuse
and providing assistance to victims. By setting up multi-disciplinary family
police stations, the police reform programme explicitly allowed a more holistic,
multilevel and multi-sectoral approach to the issue of domestic violence.
Source: Alda, E., M. Buvinić and J. Lamas (2006), “Neighbourhood Peacekeeping: The
Inter-American Development Bank’s Violence Reduction programmes in Colombia and
Uruguay”, Civil Wars, Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 197-214.
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Complementary AVR and SSR programming
Beyond including due focus on AVR aspects in SSR programmes, synergies can also be found between concurrent AVR and SSR programmes.
Awareness of the comparative advantages of each approach and the complementarity of these comparative advantages, will ensure that the most
effective combination between AVR and SSR can be coordinated while reinforcing the strength of each programme’s niche activity.
Practically, these comparative advantages can be combined into positive
synergies in a number of ways, amongst which:
•

Sequencing of efforts – for example ensuring that SSR programmes
build on existing AVR initiatives and vice versa. For more information see the chapter on entry points (Chapter 4).

•

Combining of efforts: SSR programming (for example capacitybuilding of the police to address crime) can have a deterrent impact on
crime, whereas AVR can target risk and protective factors for potential
perpetrators of that same crime (youth employment schemes, etc.) as
well as design programmes to incentivise local community members to
engage in violence reduction (for an example from Haiti, see Box 2.1).

•

Formal and informal institutions: SSR targets more formal institutional
reforms of the security provision bodies (with some level of attention
to non-state actors in justice and security). AVR can work in tandem
on reforming informal institutions (i.e. the practices, norms and values
that organise social behaviour) connected to violent behaviour.11

•

Table 3.2. gives a few practical suggestions and ideas – by no means
exhaustive – for complementary SSR and AVR programmes.
Table 3.2. Ideas for complementary AVR and SSR programmes
AVR programme

SSR programme

Neighbourhood watch groups; citizen emergency
response teams; community safety initiatives

Community-policing training programmes for police
forces; public outreach campaigns to increase police
relations with communities

Mechanisms for anonymous reporting of abuse by
security forces

Appointing official ombudsman

Gender-sensitive youth programmes to reduce risk of
recruitment or victimisation

Specialised and gender-sensitive DDR programmes to
address youth violence; gangs that recognise the distinct
roles of men and women in conflict and armed violence

Community disarmament; changing gendered cultural and SALW stockpile management programmes for police and
social norms that support weapons possession
defence forces; DDR programmes for former soldiers
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Table 3.2. Ideas for complementary AVR and SSR programmes (continued)
Supporting local peace councils to resolve non-violent
disputes

Capacity building of local justice/mediation systems

Security forums between community and state actors

Creating public oversight and accountability mechanisms

Awareness raising campaigns for communities and
children on mines and unexploded ordnance

Training of specialist de-mining units

Crime reduction through capacity building of police and
Crime reduction through community development,
“convivencia” programmes, alcohol reduction programmes justice sector to respond to and prosecute crimes and
assist victims
Rehabilitation projects for perpetrators; development and Capacity-building of justice and penal systems to pursue,
implementation of alternative sentencing programmes
prosecute and sentence perpetrators; implementing
parole systems or time limits on pre-trial detention to
reduce prison numbers
Awareness raising campaigns/sensitisation on GBV/
domestic violence; changing gendered cultural and
social norms that support GBV; assistance programmes
(shelters and services) for victims of domestic/sexual
violence

Legal reform on GBV/domestic violence (addressing
formal institutions); capacity-building of security
institutions on gender and procedures for dealing with
victims of GBV; ensuring fair representation of men and
women in the security bodies

Care for youth involved in violence or substance abuse;
campaigning to change social norms and mindsets that
contribute to youth violence

Capacity-building of police, justice and prison sectors on
addressing youth violence, prosecution and incarceration

Another way in which programmes can be mutually sensitive is by
ensuring communication between the different programmes and the actors
involved in them. By ensuring that stakeholders in SSR programmes are
aware of what is happening in AVR programming and vice versa, connections can be made where necessary.
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Box 3.2. Skopje: Combining an existing SSR programme
with a new AVR initiative
What works: The community of Old Town, in Skopje, Macedonia, suffered
from high levels of pick-pocketing and theft, drug dealing, prostitution, armed
robberies and assault. The police were perceived as weak and distrust of the
police was high. With international support a bike police unit was established,
but this proved ineffective. In this context, Saferworld, with a local partner,
implemented a community safety programme, starting by having 9 focus group
meetings with different community stakeholders to identify priorities in their
security concerns. An “Action Working Group on Safety and Security in the
Skopje Old Town (AWG)” involving representatives of a community NGO, the
municipality, the local police station, the police bike team and the local business association was set up to address the priorities. In consultation with the
police the AWG identified a way to restructure the organisational set-up of the
police station so that more patrols could take place at no additional cost. At the
same time, several community actions were taken to address crime, including
removing stalls from illegal vendors that narrowed passage ways, installing
anonymous crime reporting boards and the hiring of a private security group
as an additional crime deterrent measure. The combinations of measures led to
a modest decrease in recorded criminal incidents, including armed violence.
Why it works: The approach started by identifying priorities by community
members themselves. It then involved all relevant stakeholders, including
representatives from existing police stations and earlier reform projects in the
working group to carry out the action plan. This ensured easy and quick communication with the relevant institutions. It also seems to have allowed for
smooth connections to existing programmes, and for addressing both the formal
institutional level and community level activities.
Source: Saferworld (2006), Creating Safer Communities: Lessons from South Eastern
Europe, Saferworld, London.
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Chapter 4
Entry points

SSR as an entry point for AVR
In some cases, governments may be wary of local level interventions and
will want to control interventions closely. This is especially the case in situations of internal conflict where the government is fighting one or more rebel
groups, as for example in Sri Lanka. In such cases, the government may be
more open to discussions on institutional reform of the security institutions
than on discussions of broader AVR involving communities. Once these
reforms are initiated, efforts can be made to open up discussions with the
national authorities and advocate for complementary AVR programming. A
particular opportunity for this can be found when institutional and technical approaches fall short of expected results. This can be the case when an
SSR programme is not able to address the security needs of communities as
experienced on the ground. An example of this can be found in Haiti, where
initial programmes by the UN heavily targeted institutional capacity but, in
light of the limited effectiveness, evolved into more community-based AVR
programmes.12 Also in cases where SSR programmes are in fact yielding
good results, additional AVR programmes can be particularly reinforcing and
complementary, as in many cases where small arms reduction and legislation
efforts have formed part of SSR programming.

AVR as an entry point for SSR
Circumstances common to fragile contexts, in which the state is unable
or unwilling to effectively deliver security, justice and other services to all
its citizens, can critically hinder the practical implementation of SSR. In
such a situation, an SSR approach may not be the most appropriate entry
point for programming, given that working with state institutions is very difficult and likely to be ineffective in increasing the delivery of security and
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justice services to the local population. An extreme example of this situation
is Somalia. Under this type of condition, it may be more effective to start
with community based AVR programmes, which, besides more immediately
addressing justice and security needs at the local level, can also provide an
opening for SSR programming at a later stage.
Similarly, this approach can be taken where state institutions are abusive and/or where there is a large amount of distrust amongst the population
towards them. Building local level security initiatives as well as working with
local/non-state security and justice actors 13 can provide a basis for discussing
reforms of the security institutions and foster the population’s trust required
to enhance governance in areas where the state previously had no access.
Another way that AVR can facilitate the introduction of SSR programmes
is by virtue of its people-centred focus, evidence driven methods and advocacy work. For example, the AV lens for people and perpetrators may prompt
investigations into corruption, weakness, or abuse within one or several of the
state security sectors. If evidence can be substantiated, presenting this information to local governments or international donors may help to mobilise the
political support needed for implementing SSR programmes (for an example
from Sierra Leone, see Box 2.4).

Box 4.1. Community security teams in Cali: An AVR entry point
for community policing reform
What works: In Cali, Colombia, youth Community Security Teams (CSTs) were set up to
provide basic security for neighbourhoods that were considered too dangerous for policing
patrols to enter. The CSTs were given organisational support as well as training in first aid and
personal security by a local community peace council (DESEPAZ). After CSTs were accepted
and legitimised by the community, cooperation with the local police was initiated through
community-policing reform and formal law enforcement could gradually be reintroduced.
Why it works: Success in this case was attributed to the ability of the CSTs to improve
security conditions, garner the community’s support and initiate a more positive relationship between the local police and the local people. Building this rapport principally requires
that state security forces become familiar with local programmes and explore the benefits of
co-operation. Similarly, it is necessary for community-based projects to establish an organisational structure conducive to partnering with local authorities or (inter)national security
forces operating in the area.
Source: Hill, R., J. Temin and L. Pacholek (2007), “Building Security Where There Is No Security”,
Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 38-51.
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Chapter 5
Monitoring and evaluation
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is the practice of tracking the progress
of a programme, determining what changes it has brought about and gauging
the greater implications of those outcomes. AVR and SSR each make distinct
contributions to M&E, which reflect their particular approaches to establishing security and stability. AVR emphasises the role of the local context
and people, particularly in developing M&E indicators (OECD, 2009, p. 73).
SSR’s treatment of M&E is oriented toward programme management, particularly as a tool for process appraisal and adjustment (OECD, 2007, p. 71).
The contributions of each primarily fall within: (a) developing indicators and
(b) involving local stakeholders.

Developing indicators
Within M&E, indicators are precise descriptions of evidence that can
measure the level of change brought about by a programme. Identifying
indicators at the planning stage helps to clarify project objectives and enables
baseline assessment, which allows a programme’s progress and impact to be
measured against initial conditions. The SSR Handbook suggests evaluation
criteria that follow general OECD standards for assessing development programmes, broken down into the following categories: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. Additionally, a description is
given on important characteristics of indicators, such as measurability, context-specificity, clarity and feasibility (OECD, 2007, p. 72). The AVR policy
paper contributes insight on adapting indicators to local levels and specific
projects (OECD, 2009 p. 73). When designing indicators, the complementarity of these approaches highlights a focus on, among others:
•

what indicators best reflect manifestations of violence as experienced
by local men and women, boys and girls
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•

which manifestations of violence can be realistically targeted; which
are beyond the reasonable scope of the programmes’ impact

•

what local behaviours can be used to indicate popular attitudes,
beliefs and/or perceptions; how might those behaviours vary between
different impacted groups

•

what indicators are specific to the micro-level and thereby offer more
acute evidence for the impact of a specific programme at the local level

•

what existing data sources (i.e. school attendance records, medical
clinic records) could supply relevant information without having to
develop new monitoring systems

Involving local stakeholders: Ownership and frontline capacities
Developing locally attuned indicators opens a valuable opportunity to
include local stakeholders in the early stages of programme design, ensuring
that expectations are realistic and fostering a common vision of success held
by the donor, recipient state and communities. While both SSR and AVR
note the importance of involving local partners, their reasons for doing so
reflect their distinct approaches. SSR emphasises the participation of local
stakeholders in programme evaluations as part and parcel of building both
local ownership and state-society relations within the partner country (OECD,
2007, p. 242). AVR accentuates how local participation in M&E enables
programmes to access local insight and capitalise on the rooted position of
community members for rapid monitoring and response. Moreover, including
local stakeholders in the development of benchmarks and indicators increases
the capacity of the community for research and advocacy (OECD, 2009, p. 73).
This can fortify longer-term civil society oversight of the security forces,
which contributes to the sustainability of reforms in the security system.
Developing local knowledge and skill in systematic data collection,
recording and reporting, as well as data analysis for M&E on issues of security and armed violence (with a gender focus) are just a few examples of how
donors can effectively partner with local actors whilst encouraging local
ownership and increasing long-term sustainability. What is more, implementing ongoing local monitoring programmes can work as an early warning
system and improve the level of knowledge on issues such as corruption.
This could enable local partners, given their frontline proximity, to engage in
rapid-response and preventative activities.
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Box 5.1. Mali: Participatory monitoring and evaluation
What works: Citing the critical need to recognise the value of local perceptions, the United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) conducted a study highlighting the
benefits of participatory monitoring and evaluation (PM&E) approaches. Premised on the
idea that positive outcomes must be apparent to the affected communities in order for disarmament campaigns to be successful, UNIDIR applied PM&E to assess the local impact of a
weapons collection programme in Mali. Community members and programme beneficiaries
identified a range of indicators that they felt were relevant to and significant of the programme’s outcomes. These indicators, often qualitative, described observable behaviours that
local stakeholders used to assess, inter alia, security and the restoration of social capital in
their community. This was presented as an alternative to applying pre-determined, and often
strictly quantitative, indicators – such as number of weapons collected – which do not always
reflect local standards of success.
Why it works: PM&E was applied to create monitoring practices that emphasise how local
stakeholders perceive their situation and the programme. Given that M&E indicators often
receive a great deal of attention from donors and practitioners, including accurate portrayals
of local expectations and assessments in M&E criteria can allay conflicting interpretations
of success between local and foreign stakeholders. The study elicited several indicators of
how a particular community defined security, how they understood the disarmament programme and how they believed they could contribute to it. Such information could also work
to manage expectations, encourage sustained monitoring from the ground, as well as bolster
local ownership by providing clear and concrete venues for local input.
Source: Mugumya, G. (2004), Exchanging Weapons for Development in Mali: weapons collection
programmes assessed by local people, UNIDIR (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research),
Geneva.; Muggah, R. (2005a), Listening for a Change! Participatory Evaluation of DDR and Arms
Reduction in Mali, Cambodia and Albania, UNIDIR, Geneva.
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Notes
1.	In keeping with the OECD terminology and definitions, this paper will use the
term Security System Reform, however it is recognised that this is not the only
term used to refer to SSR-style programming. Other terms include, amongst
others, Security Sector Reform, Security and Justice Reform (SJR), Security Sector
Development (SSD) and sometimes Rule of Law programming. Although the term
used in this paper is Security System Reform, the paper’s ideas are equally applicable to other programmes with similar objectives, regardless of the terminology.
2.	Chapter 7 of the OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (OECD,
2007) discusses programming for each of the sectors and indicates, per sector,
the relevant linkages with other sectors of the security system, which need to
be considered in programming. Please refer to this chapter for a more detailed
explanation of the various programmatic options.
3.	Children and youth form a particularly important category for AVR programming. For more information on programming for youth violence reduction programming, see the OECD’s programming note on this.
4.	One clear example is the OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (2007).
5.	In that sense, SSR can be seen as a statebuilding effort, as “it attempts to reinforce the positive reciprocal relations between a state that delivers services for
its people and social and political groups who constructively engage with their
state” (Wyeth and Sisk, 18 June 2009, p. 5, citing OECD (2008), Statebuilding in
Situations of Fragility: Initial Findings).
6.	In that sense, AVR could be considered a peacebuilding approach, which
“involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing
into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development” (Wyeth
and Sisk, 18 June, 2009, p.5, citing Conceptual basis for peacebuilding for the
UN system adopted by the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee, May 2007).
However, AVR is broader than peacebuilding, in that it addresses many more factors than the national capacities at all levels for conflict management.
7.

However, an AVR approach in assessments should not replace existing assessment
methodologies. Rather, it can help draw together several assessment methodologies
and make assessments and hence programming more sensitive to armed violence.
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For a more detailed explanation, see: “Chapter 4: Assessments: Applying the
Armed Violence Lens” (OECD, 2009).
8.	An example from Colombia demonstrates how the correlation between armed
violence and alcohol consumption led to municipal restrictions on liquor sales,
which is purported to have effectively reduced homicide rates (Atwood, Glatz
and Muggah, 2006, p.26).
9.	The public health approach involves a very technical form of research, requiring specialised training in data collection, survey design, sampling techniques,
and statistical analysis. Contracting assessment projects to epidemiologists –
particularly those familiar with conflict research – or including them as part of
assessment teams and programme staff can facilitate this process. For further
discussion, see: Thoms and Ron (2008).
10.	Another example of an integration of an AVR emphasis in a police reform programme can be found in the Community Based Policing programme in Kenya.
For more information on this, see: Saferworld (2008), Implementing CommunityBased Policing in Kenya, Saferworld, London.
11.	For examples of how informal institutions can be addressed, see: WHO (2009b).
12.	UNDP DDR 3rd Quarterly report cites SC/RES/1702 (2006) which “recognises
the limitations of a DDR approach... and further recognises the role of the community in preparing the Republic of Haiti for gradual withdrawal of [Peace
Keeping Operations]... This resolution is the successful outcome of a long and
tough struggle undertaken by the DDR Integrated Section since mid-2005,
advocating that...an innovative strategy with a strong focus on ‘putting weapons
beyond use in the context of community security approach’ must be developed.”
(UNDP, 2006).
13.	For a discussion of the policy and conceptual issues involved in working with
local/non-state justice and security actors, see: Scheye (2009b).
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